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EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE: A CAUSE OF
ACTION IN NEED OF A CALL FOR ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Illiteracy has recently become a focus of national concern. With in-
creasing recognition of this national problem, spurred by a recent surge of
media attention,1 questions have surfaced concerning the overall effective-
ness of public educational systems. When students attend an individual
school system for twelve years or more, subsequently graduating and enter-
ing the work force as functional illiterates, the implications of illiteracy sug-
gest the presence of some serious flaws in the educational systems.
The importance of education in contemporary American society cannot
be understated. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Brown v.
Board of Education,2 "[tioday, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. '"' Education prepares children to
participate intelligently and effectively in the electoral process, thus ensur-
ing the survival of the political system." Moreover, a quality educational
system will prepare citizens to exercise their most important fundamental
First Amendment freedoms both as sources and receivers of information.5
With the increasing level of technological advancement in the twentieth
century, the critical need for a thorough education of all citizens encom-
1. See, e.g., ABC Notebook: Illiteracy (ABC television broadcast, October 28, 1986);
Lord & Horn, The Brain Battle, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 19, 1987, at 60.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Id. at 493. The United States Supreme Court added:
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principle
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.
Id.
4. Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (holding
that a state constitutional provision declaring that it is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of resident children was not a mere preamble, but was
mandatory and imposed a judicially enforceable, affirmative duty, such that compliance with
that duty can only be met if there are sufficient funds derived through dependable and regular
tax sources, not special excess levies).
5. Id. at 517, 585 P.2d at 94.
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passing at least the most basic academic skills becomes even more apparent.
Despite the vital role of education in contemporary society, many
American public schools have failed to provide students with adequate aca-
demic programs. The unfortunate plight of the American educational sys-
tems warranted nationwide recognition with the release of an extensive re-
port by the National Commission on Excellence in Education in 1983.1 The
Commission declared that "the educational foundations of our society are
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very
future as a Nation and a people."' The Commission also uncovered several
alarming dimensions of the educational crisis currently facing the Nation,
calling for immediate action to eliminate this crisis.8
The purpose of this note is to address and reform one dimension of this
crisis by encouraging judicial recognition of educational malpractice claims.
After providing a general background discussion of the various issues which
are raised in this area, this note will illustrate the past development and
failure of the educational malpractice theory as applied in the current case
law. The note will then address several alternative theories of recovery that
have been previously advanced. Finally, this note will propose that the the-
ory of recovery grounded in negligence can be utilized. This note will de-
velop an appropriate and workable standard of care to aid in judicial assess-
ment of educational malpractice complaints through legislative recognition
of such a cause of action.'
6. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative For Educational Reform, AMERICAN EDUCATION,
June 1983, at 2 [hereinafter A Nation at Risk] (Final Report of the National Commission on
Excellence in Education) (urging changes in high school graduation requirements, longer
school days, increased school funding and teacher wages, and competency testing for teachers).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Among the findings of the Commission on Excellence in Education were the follow-
ing: international comparisons of student achievement tests revealed that American students
rated considerably lower than students in other industrialized nations; some 23 million Ameri-
can adults were found to be functionally illiterate; 13 percent of all 17-year-old individuals in
the United States can be considered functionally illiterate, with functional illiteracy among
minority youths estimated as high as 40 percent; the College Board's Scholastic Aptitude Tests
(SAT) demonstrated a virtually unbroken decline from 1963 to 1980 during which average
verbal skills scores fell over 50 points and average mathematics scores fell nearly 40 points;
nearly 40 percent of 17-year-old Americans cannot draw inferences from written material;
only one-fifth can write a persuasive essay; and only one-third can solve a mathematics prob-
lem requiring several steps. Id.
9. Although educational malpractice has received previous attention from various com-
mentators, the proposal advanced in this note is a novel approach. The majority of the educa-
tional malpractice literature focuses on the establishment of a legal duty in the educators. See
infra note 99. However, the underlying principle in the courts' nonrecognition of a legal duty is
the general reluctance to develop and utilize a workable standard of care to determine whether
a duty has been in fact breached. Instead of looking to the duty of care in the educators, this
note will look to the standard of care needed in the educational malpractice arena.
[Vol. 22
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II. BACKGROUND
In response to the current crisis facing the American educational sys-
tems, several students have initiated lawsuits against their schools for "edu-
cational malpractice," or failure to educate.10 Most of these student-plain-
tiffs graduated from high school, yet remained functionally illiterate. These
students lacked the ability to form the mature and informed judgment nec-
essary to secure gainful employment, as well as the ability to effectively
manage their own lives." The students have based their lawsuits upon vari-
ous legal theories of recovery, the most popular being the traditional princi-
ples underlying professional negligence. 12
The essential formula invoked in professional negligence cases requires
the professional to possess and use the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily
employed by members of the particular profession in good standing.13 Pro-
10. "Malpractice" is defined as:
[P]rofessional misconduct or unreasonable lack of skill. This term is usually applied to
such conduct by doctors, lawyers, and accountants. Failure of one rendering professional
services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the
circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profes-
sion with the result of injury, loss or damage to the recipient of those services or those
entitled to rely upon them. It is any professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or
fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (5th ed. 1979). Although "educational malpractice" has not
been recognized by the courts as a legally remediable cause of action, the term "educational
malpractice" has been used by the court and various commentators in reference to complaints
against educators alleging professional misconduct similar to medical or legal malpractice.
"Educational malpractice" as used in this note will refer to professional misconduct of educa-
tors. However, the scope of this note includes actions against educators based upon grounds of
constitutional and contract law, as well as negligence.
I1. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1976) (plaintiff remained unable to read and write above the fifth grade level despite
graduation from high school, and thus unqualified for any employment other than labor which
requires little or no ability to read or write); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47
N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979) (plaintiff lacked even rudimentary
ability to comprehend written English on a level sufficient to enable him to complete an appli-
cation for employment); Myers v. Medford Lakes Bd. of Educ., 199 N.J. Super. 511, 489 A.2d
1240 (1985) (plaintiff brought action against school district for failure to provide him with
special remedial education to assist him to overcome his academic deficiencies).
"Functional illiteracy" refers to a general unsatisfactory application of basic skills in
reading, writing, and arithmetic, to problems of a practical nature encountered in everyday
life. See Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 258 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Florida statute requiring passage of a minimum competency test before
receiving a high school diploma, although unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff because of
lack of notice).
12. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
13. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 187 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
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fessional negligence cases have involved doctors," dentists,' 8 pharmacists,16
psychiatrists,1 7 veterinarians,"8 lawyers,' 9 architects and engineers,20 ac-
countants,21 abstractors of title,22 and many other professions and trades.2
Professionals are generally required not only to exercise reasonable care in
what they do, but also to possess a certain degree of special knowledge or
ability.24 The law demands of professionals conduct consistent with their
superior learning and experience, in addition to any special skills, knowl-
edge, or training they may personally possess over and above that normally
held by persons in that particular field.25
The law of torts, which underlies professional negligence and most edu-
cational malpractice complaints, 6 is concerned with the allocation of losses
arising out of human activities.27 The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust
these losses and provide compensation for injuries sustained as a result of
unreasonable or socially harmful conduct.2 The failure to educate a stu-
14. See, e.g., Walls v. Boyett, 216 Ark. 541, 226 S.W.2d 552 (1950); Hill v. Boughton,
146 Fla. 505, 1 So. 2d 610 (1941); De Laughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190, 164 So. 2d 762
(1964).
15. Willard v. Hagemeister, 121 Cal. App. 3d 406, 175 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1981); Rice v.
Jaskolski, 412 Mich. 206, 313 N.W.2d 893 (1981); See generally W. MORRIS, DENTAL LITI-
GATION (1972).
16. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (pregnancy from phar-
macist's negligence in filling a prescription for oral contraceptive with a tranquilizer); French
Drug Co. v. Jones, 367 So. 2d 431 (Miss. 1978).
17. Ray v. Ameri-Care Hospital, 400 So. 2d 1127 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Cotton v.
Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W.2d 627 (1980). See generally J. SMITH, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: PSYCHIATRIC CARE (1986).
18. Bartlett v. MacRae, 54 Or. App. 516, 635 P.2d 666 (1981); Ruden v. Hansen, 206
N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1973); Posnie v. Rogers, 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975).
19. See, e.g., Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239
(1972); Caltrider v. Weant, 147 Md. 338, 128 A. 72 (1925); McLellan v. Fuller, 220 Mass.
494, 108 N.E. 180 (1915).
20. Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 22 Md. App. 673, 325 A.2d 432 (1974); City of Eve-
leth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 225 N.W.2d 521 (1975). See generally J. ACRET, ARCHITECTS
& ENGINEERS (2d ed. 1984); R. VAUGH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ENGINEERING (4th ed. 1983).
21. Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311
Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898,
451 A.2d 1308 (1982).
22. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
23. Chamness v. Odum, 80 Ill. App. 3d 98, 35 11. Dec. 404, 399 N.E.2d 238 (1979)
(chiropractor); Fantini v. Alexander, 172 N.J. Super. 105, 410 A.2d 1190 (1980) (karate
teacher); Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526 (1979) (pilot);
Bambert v. Central Gen. Hosp., 77 A.D.2d 559, 430 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1980) (nurse).
24. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 185.
25. Id.
26. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
27. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 1, at 6 (discussing the wide scope of human
activities covered by the law of torts).
28. Id. at 7.
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dent in a system specifically designed and, in most cases, required to pro-
vide an education represents a prime example of blatant, unreasonable, and
socially harmful conduct; 9 however, the law will hold a party responsible
only for that which the law recognizes as unjustified." Therefore, the courts
must first recognize that the failure to educate is a justified claim.
The courts have generally refused to recognize educational malpractice
as a legally remediable cause of action.31 The fear of judicial involvement in
29. In light of the fundamental importance of education, as well as the vital role educa-
tion plays in contemporary society, an educator's failure to educate is indeed socially harmful
conduct. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
30. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § I, at 4. "Not only may a morally innocent
person be held liable for the damage done, but many a scoundrel has been guilty of moral
outrages, such as base ingratitude, without committing any tort. It is legal justification which
must be looked to .... " Id.
31. D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981)
(holding that action for damages could not be maintained against school district for negligent
teaching, placement, or classification of students suffering from dyslexia); Smith v. Alameda
County Social Serv. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979) (holding no
cause of action lay on behalf of child against school district for negligently placing child in
classes for the mentally retarded under circumstances where district knew or should have
known that child was not in fact retarded); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60
Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976) (complaint dismissed where plaintiff graduated
from high school yet remained functionally illiterate); Tubell v. Dade County Pub. Schools,
419 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff's educational malpractice complaint which
alleged misclassification and improper placement in a special education program for several
years to his detriment was dismissed for failure to state a claim); Doe v. Board of Educ., 295
Md. 67, 453 A.2d 814 (1982) (holding that complaint of former student and parents alleging
the negligent evaluation and placement of a learning disabled student within the school system
failed to state a cause of action); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582
(1982) (complaint against school board, elementary school principal, and teacher for educa-
tional malpractice in negligently evaluating child's learning abilities failed to state a claim);
Myers v. Medford Lake Bd. of Educ., 199 N.J. Super. 511, 489 A.2d 1240 (1985) (plaintiff's
claim of educational malpractice against school board for failure to provide him with special
remedial education to assist him to overcome his academic deficiencies was dismissed because
plaintiff failed to state a claim under the state tort claims act); Torres v. Little Flower Chil-
dren's Serv., 64 N.Y.2d 119, 474 N.E.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1984) (former student, who
remained functionally illiterate despite having received public education, unsuccessfully
brought action against the social services department and child care agency with which he was
placed after his abandonment by his mother); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400
N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979) (plaintiff's complaint, alleging educational malpractice
in the school board by negligently failing to assess his intellectual ability and placing him in
special educational program for children with retarded mental development, was dismissed for
failure to state a claim); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979) (dismissing action for educational malpractice based
on claim that notwithstanding receipt of a certificate of high school graduation, plaintiff re-
mained functionally illiterate); Cavello v. Sherburne-Earlville Cent. School Dist., 110 A.D.2d
253, 494 N.Y.S.2d 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that students could not maintain an
action for lost education and training due to school's negligence in supervising other students);
Washington v. City of New York, 83 A.D.2d 866, 442 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981) (action dismissed
where plaintiff claimed educational malpractice in the school by negligently evaluating and
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the daily implementation of educational policies is perhaps the primary
public policy consideration relied upon by the courts in rejecting educa-
tional malpractice claims.32 The complex and often delicate process of edu-
cating, involving the daily professional judgment of educators and adminis-
trative school officials, represents an area in which the courts are extremely
reluctant to intervene absent gross violations of clearly defined public pol-
icy. 3 However, considerations of public policy demand, in the interests of
justice, a legal remedy for individuals denied an opportunity to obtain a
minimally adequate education.34
The true victims of educational malpractice clearly suffer measurable
injuries affecting both real economic and social values.36 In a broader sense,
placing plaintiff in special educational facility after being suspended from school for assaulting
teacher with a knife); Denson v. Steubenville Bd. of Educ., No. 85-J-31, slip op. (Ohio Ct.
App. July 29, 1986) (educational malpractice complaint dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action and statute of limitations where plaintiff claimed school officials promoted him in
school through twelfth grade without teaching him to read, while nurturing his athletic ability
at the expense of his formal education).
32. See Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy the Growing Prob-
lem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 27, 37 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Judi-
cial Remedy) (addressing the fear of judicial activism in education).
33. The courts have not elaborated on the meaning of "gross violations of public policy"
in this context, but the courts have specifically articulated their unwillingness to intervene in
the administration of the public school systems except in the most exceptional circumstances
involving "gross violations of defined public policy." Matter of New York City School Bd.
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 121, 347 N.E.2d 568, 574, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 214
(1976). See also Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 400 N.E.2d 317, 320, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440,
444, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979). However, "public policy" is
defined as follows:
That principle of the law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has
a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. . . . Thus, certain
classes of acts are said to be "against public policy," when the law refuses to enforce or
recognize them, on the ground that they have a mischievous tendency, so as to be injuri-
ous to the interests of the state, apart from illegality or immorality.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979). Clearly, the failure of the educational sys-
tems to provide a quality education to students is indeed injurious to the interests of the state
in maintaining the general welfare of its citizens. Therefore, arguably, the courts are unwilling
to intervene in educational issues even in the presence of gross violations of public policy.
34. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
35. In Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 818, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (1976), the alleged injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of educa-
tional malpractice consisted of a loss of earning capacity and a permanent inability to gain
meaningful employment because Peter W. was unable to read and write above a fifth grade
level. Furthermore, Peter W. sought special damages incurred as the cost of compensatory
tutoring. See also Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979) (plaintiff unsuccessfully sought $5,000,000 to redress his in-
jury because, notwithstanding his receipt of a high school diploma, the plaintiff lacked even the
rudimentary ability to comprehend written English on a level sufficient to enable him to com-
plete an application for employment); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 490 N.Y.2d 121, 400
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society at large suffers as a result of educational malpractice.36 Although
the law does not, and cannot, provide a remedy for every injury,37 the inter-
ests of justice clearly require judicial intervention and legal compensation
for those injuries resulting from acts of educational malpractice.3 8 However,
the right to such intervention and consequent compensation has not yet
been recognized.
N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979) (At trial, the jury awarded plaintiff damages in the
amount of $750,000 for the severe injury to plaintiff's intellectual and emotional well-being
and his reduced ability to obtain employment. The Appellate Division affirmed his judgment
but reduced the amount of the verdict to $500,000. However, the Court of Appeals of New
York reversed the ruling and dismissed the case).
36. Speaking before more than 2,000 concerned educators and government officials in
Indianapolis, President Reagan stated: "If America is to offer greater economic opportunity to
her citizens, if she's to defend our freedom, democracy, and keep the peace, then our children
will need wisdom, courage, and strength - virtues beyond their reach without education." The
President's Address to the National Forum on Excellence in Education, AMERICAN EDUCA-
TION, Mar. 1984, at 2. Business and military leaders complain that they are required to spend
millions of dollars on costly remedial education and training programs in such basic skills as
reading, writing, spelling, and computation. One-quarter of the recent recruits of the United
States Navy cannot read at the ninth grade level, the minimal level necessary to understand
written safety instructions. Without remedial training, these recruits cannot even begin, much
less complete, the sophisticated training essential in the modern military. A Nation at Risk,
supra note 6, at 6. As technology leaps ahead, the requirement for a literate citizenry, able to
master the implications of modern technologies grows even more important. Interests of na-
tional security and the future ability of the American economy to compete in the international
marketplace are at stake. Orr, Are We a Nation of Scientific Illiterates?, AMERICAN EDUCA-
TION, Apr. 1983, at 24.
37. In Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363,
365 (1977), parents of an infant daughter who was born with and eventually succumbed to
Tay-Sachs disease brought an action against a physician, seeking damages for mental distress,
and contending that the physician should have known of the high risk that the fetus would
suffer from the disease. Had the parents been advised that the fetus was afflicted with Tay-
Sachs, they would have aborted the pregnancy. In denying recovery of the parents, the court
held:
There can be no doubt that the plaintiffs have suffered and the temptation is great to
offer them some form of relief. Ideally, there should be a remedy for every wrong. This is
not the function of the law, however, for "every injury has ramifying consequences, like
the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem of the law is to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree."
Id. at 113, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d
609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561).
38. For a discussion of the nature of educational malpractice injuries as against public
policy, see supra note 33.
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III. THE PERCEIVED FAILURE OF THE EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
THEORY
In Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District,9 the plaintiff
received a high school diploma after attending the requisite twelve years of
school." Despite graduating, the plaintiff was not capable of reading or
writing above the fifth grade level.' Consequently, Peter W. initiated an
action against the school district seeking legal redress for injuries allegedly
caused by the school's negligence: in other words, for educational
malpractice.42
The plaintiff in Peter W. contended that the defendant school district
negligently failed to provide him with adequate instruction, guidance, and
supervision in basic academic skills, and failed to exercise that degree of
professional skill required of an ordinary prudent educator under the same
circumstances.4" Specifically, Peter W. alleged that the school district acted
negligently by (1) failing to comprehend his reading disabilities, (2) as-
signing him to classes in which he could not read the books and materials,
(3) allowing him to pass and advance from courses or grade levels with
39. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
40. Id. at 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856. California has enacted legislation requiring stu-
dents to meet certain standards of proficiency in basic skills before any diploma, certificate, or
other similar document may be conferred on a pupil as evidence of completion of a prescribed
course of study. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51412 (West 1978). These standards of proficiency in-
clude reading comprehension, writing, and computation skills, in the English language, neces-
sary to succeed in school and life experiences. Id. § 51215(c).
41. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
When American public educational systems were first envisioned, the country was primar-
ily an agrarian society. Two centuries ago, perhaps, a fifth-grade reading level would suffice to
prepare a child to enter adulthood. However, today such a low level of reading skill would
qualify an individual for very few, if any, jobs. Despite this widely recognized fact, as the 21st
century nears, many American educational systems remain geared to a schedule reflecting the
needs of a 19th century agrarian society. For example, although few American students have
crops to tend, most take three months of vacation from school every summer, a vacation origi-
nally designed for an agriculture-oriented society. Lord & Horn, supra note 1, at 60. Even
with the growing technological demands facing contemporary society on an international level,
a mere 15 American states require high school students to take four years of English. Only 10
states require three years of math. No state requires two years of foreign language classes.
Although most states have raised science requirements, the number of qualified science teach-
ers is shrinking so fast that often the positions are filled by people such as the school football
coaches. Id. at 64.
42. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
The alleged injuries which Peter W. asserted as part of his legal claim consisted of a loss
of earning capacity and a permanent inability to gain meaningful employment, clearly lauda-
ble and compensable claims. Id. For a discussion of judicial recognition of plaintiffs' right to
recover compensation for the impairment of earning capacity, see 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §
89; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906 comment c (1977).
43. Peter W, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
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knowledge that he had not achieved the skills necessary for him to succeed
or benefit from subsequent courses, (4) assigning him to classes in which
the instructors were either unqualified or not "geared" to his reading level,
and (5) permitting him to graduate although he was unable to read above
the eighth grade level, as required by California law."" Furthermore, to ful-
fill the traditional formula of elements necessary for a cause of action
sounding in negligence,'5 the plaintiff argued that the requisite duty of care
on the part of the school district could be established under three alterna-
tive theories."8
The first theory which supported the existence of a duty involved an
"assumption of duty" argument.' 7 Under this theory, the school district as-
sumed the function of student instruction, and such assumption necessarily
imposed the duty to exercise reasonable care in its discharge.4 8 At first
glance, any assumption of duty by the school district did not appear to ac-
tually harm the plaintiff, since he entered the school with no education and
left with some positive degree of education, albeit minimal. However, fur-
ther analysis reveals that the school district could have misled the student
to believe that he was receiving an adequate education, thereby depriving
him of the opportunity to seek outside aid, such as aid from a private school
or a tutor.' 9
44. Id. See also CAL. EDUC. COOE § 51225 (West 1978).
45. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 30, at 164-65. The elements of a cause of
action founded upon negligence are:
I. a duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a
certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: a breach of
the duty ....
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting in-
jury ....
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
Id. at 164-65.
46. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
47. Id. at 819, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858. For a discussion of the assumption of duty theory,
see generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 56. By affirmatively undertaking to give
aid to another, a defendant may be liable for assuming a duty and subsequently making the
plaintiff's situation worse, either by increasing the danger, by misleading the plaintiff into the
belief that it has been removed, or by depriving him of help from other sources. See also Note,
The ABC's of Duty: Educational Malpractice and the Functionally Illiterate Student, 8
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 293 (1978) [hereinafter Note, The ABC's of Duty] (arguing that a
basis for establishing a school district's duty may lie in the state's voluntary assumption of the
job of educating children).
48. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
49. If no duty to educate existed previously, the school's voluntary assumption of the
function of student instruction at least imposed the duty to avoid any affirmative acts which
make the student's situation worse. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 56, at 378;
Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1977) (police
disposed of drunkard near highway, instead of jail, thereby making drunkard's situation
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A second theory supporting the establishment of a legal duty involved
a special relationship between students and teachers.51 Under this "special
relationship" theory, certain relationships which involve some form of
power in one party and a correlative type of vulnerability in another party
may give rise to a legal duty.51 Allegedly, the school district held such a
position of power superior to the uneducated students, thereby leaving the
students vulnerable to the unbridled discretion of the school district. 52 This
situation of inequality allegedly gave rise to a special relationship support-
ing the duty of the school district to exercise reasonable care in instructing
the students.5 8
A third theory involved the previous judicial recognition of a similar
duty. A legal duty to exercise reasonable care in the instruction and super-
vision of students has warranted judicial recognition in cases involving
physical injuries on schoolgrounds.54 A logical expansion of this duty of
worse); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., II A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960) (doctor at-
tempted to give free advice over telephone).
50. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
In support of this theory, the plaintiff cited a wide-ranged array of cases which addressed
various rights or privileges of public school students, but none of which involved the specific
question of whether the school owed them a duty of care in the process of their education. Id.
51. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 56, at 374. During the last century, custom,
public sentiment, and views of social policy have led to judicial recognition of an affirmative
duty in a limited group of relationships where no such duty to act would otherwise be imposed.
Id. See Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1982);
M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
A duty arising from such a special relationship has been previously recognized as existing
between landlords and tenants, carriers and passengers, employers and employees, hosts and
guests, and jailers and prisoners. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 56, at 376-377.
52. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
53. The student is also involved in another "special relationship," namely, the relation-
ship between parent and child. The parent-child relationship has been recognized as giving rise
to a legal duty of care in criminal cases. See, e.g., State v. Rivers, 133 Mont. 129, 320 P.2d
1004 (1958) (defendant was convicted of second degree murder for her omission to provide
sufficient food and care for her three-month-old daughter); State v. Zobel, 81 S.D. 260, 134
N.W.2d 101 (1965) (defendant-parent convicted of murder for neglect, exposure, and depriva-
tion of necessary food or medical care of child). In an educational malpractice action, any
possibility of establishing such a duty of care in the educators under a "special relationship"
theory may be superceded by the "special relationship" between parent and child. Arguably,
the child is not absolutely vulnerable to the educators' whims because of the parents' contribu-
tion to the education process. The parents generally supervise homework, participate in parent-
teacher meetings, and actively view their children on a daily basis. Conceivably, however, an
uneducated, lower-income class parent, possibly working two or more jobs to support a family,
would not be able to significantly participate in the student's education. Moreover, such a
parent would be unlikely to recognize any learning deficiencies on the part of the student,
thereby maintaining the special power-vulnerability relationship between the educator and stu-
dent. This situation would present a stronger argument for the establishment of a legal duty of
care in the school district based upon a special relationship.
54. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858. Mastrangelo v. West Side Union
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care for the physical safety of students results in a duty of care for the
mental well-being of the students as well. Arguably, the courts' previous
recognition of a duty to exercise reasonable care in the instruction and su-
pervision of students included the duty to exercise reasonable care in pro-
viding students with education.55
Despite the plausibility of these theories for establishing a legal duty of
care in the school district, the Peter W. court rejected all three theories "for
want of relevant authority. '5 6 The court relied upon considerations of pub-
lic policy in refusing to recognize the duty. 7 Citing Rowland v. Christian,58
the court first delineated the various public policy considerations warranting
non-recognition of a duty in the educational systems, including the foresee-
ability of harm to the plaintiff, the closeness of the connection between de-
fendant's conduct and the injury suffered, and the extent of the burden to
the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach. 59 These general policy con-
siderations laid the groundwork for the more specific actual public policies
enunciated as the reasons for denial of the duty.
The primary public policy concern in the Peter W. court's analysis was
defined as the absence of a workable standard of care against which an
educator's conduct could be measured. 0 As the court stated: "Unlike the
activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom methodology affords
no readily acceptable standard of care, or cause, or injury."6 1 The court
High School Dist., 2 Cal. 2d 540, 42 P.2d 634 (1935) (explosion in chemistry class resulting in
loss of student's hand and eye); Damgaard v. Oakland High School Dist., 212 Cal. 316, 298 P.
983 (1931) (explosion in chemistry class causing student to lose eye); Klenzendorf v. Shasta
Union High School Dist., 4 Cal. App. 2d 164, 40 P.2d 878 (1935) (injury in woodshop class
causing loss of fingertips); Dutcher v. City of Santa Rosa High School Dist., 156 Cal. App. 2d
256, 319 P.2d 14 (1957) (explosion in auto mechanics class resulting in death of one student
and severe injuries to another); Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., II Cal. 2d 576,
81 P.2d 894 (1938) (injury from tumbling exercise in physical education class). See generally
Note, The ABC's of Duty, supra note 47.
55. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 823, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
58. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (action for injuries sustained
by social guest of tenant when knob of cold water faucet broke while he was using it).
59. Id. at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at
823, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-860.
60. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
61. Id. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
The Peter W. court added:
The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with different and conflicting theories of how or
what a child should be taught, and any layman might - and commonly does - have his
own emphatic views on the subject. The "injury" claimed here is plaintiff's inability to
read and write. Substantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy
in the schools, or its failure, are influenced by a host of factors which affect the pupil
19881
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reasoned that, because so many variable factors influence the process of
education, no single standard of care could be applied to the educators.
Another public policy consideration utilized by the court in refusing to rec-
ognize a legal duty involved the fear that to hold educators to an actionable
duty of care would expose the schools to countless tort claims and ulti-
mately result, in terms of public time and money, in consequences beyond
calculation.62
A later decision involving educational malpractice in the New York
court system followed the lead of the California decision in Peter W. The
essence of the plaintiff's claims in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
District6" was substantially similar to that in Peter W. 4 The plaintiff in
Donohue attributed his educational deficiency to the failure of the defend-
ant school district to perform its duties and obligations to provide an ade-
quate education." Like Peter W., the Donohue court denied a cause of ac-
tion for educational malpractice. 66
subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond the control of its min-
isters. They may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they may
be present but not perceived, recognized but not identified.
Id.
62. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
Thus, the court manifested its reluctance to recognize a cause of action for educational mal-
practice by refusing to impose a legal duty of care upon the school district based on public
policy considerations. In affirming the dismissal of Peter W.'s complaint, the court also re-
jected the cause of action based upon negligent misrepresentation in accordance with its previ-
ous analysis of the negligence action, where the court failed to find a duty of care. Id. at 828,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. Furthermore, the alternative cause of action for intentional misrepre-
sentation was dismissed because the pleadings did not show the requisite element of "reliance"
as required under California law. Id. at 828, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863. Consequently, the court's
decision to not recognize a duty of care in Peter W. has had a substantial impact on subse-
quent educational malpractice actions.
63. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
64. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854.
Like Peter W., Donohue was a high school graduate unable to comprehend even written Eng-
lish on a level sufficient to enable him to simply complete an application for employment.
Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
65. Id.
66. Donohue's complaint consisted of two separate causes of action, the first of which
sounded in the traditional negligence principles of a professional malpractice action, and the
second of which alleged the negligent breach of a constitutionally imposed duty to educate.
The court quickly dismissed the second cause of action by noting that the New York Constitu-
tion (art. IX, § 1) provides for a state duty only to maintain and support a system of public
education, and was not intended to impose a duty to ensure that each individual pupil receive a
minimum level of education. Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d
at 377. In addressing Donohue's first cause of action, the court conceded that within the stric-
tures of a traditional negligence or malpractice action, a complaint sounding in educational
malpractice could be formally pleaded, and the creation of a workable standard of care in
which to assess an educator's performance of a duty did not necessarily pose an insurmounta-
ble burden. Id. at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The court further reasoned
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Following the reasoning applied in Peter W., the Donohue court dis-
missed the plaintiff's complaint citing public policy considerations as the
primary justification. 67 The court summarized these public policy considera-
tions as follows:
To entertain a cause of action for "educational malpractice"
would require the courts not merely to make judgment as to the
validity of broad educational policies - a course we have
unalteringly eschewed in the past - but, more importantly, to
sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of these policies.
Recognition in the courts of this cause of action would constitute
blatant interference with the responsibility for the administra-
tion of the public school system lodged by Constitution and stat-
ute in school administrative agencies. 68
The Donohue court concluded that the sole authority to make any educa-
tional policy determinations was vested in the New York Board of Regents
and the Commissioner of Education, not the courts.69
In analyzing both Peter W. and Donohue, it becomes apparent that the
courts were relying upon seemingly tenuous arguments in refusing to recog-
nize a cause of action for educational malpractice. The Peter W. court used
a "floodgate" theory in rejecting the claim, voicing the fear that to recog-
nize educational malpractice would virtually "open the floodgates" for
countless tort claims.70 Additionally, the Peter W. court found no workable
standard of care against which the educators' conduct could be measured.7
1
However, the court in Donohue specifically stated that the creation of a
workable standard of care did not pose an insurmountable burden. 72 More-
over, the Donohue court conceded that an educational malpractice action fit
within the strictures of a traditional negligence action.7 3 Despite this con-
cession, Donohue's complaint was nevertheless dismissed because the court
did not want to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation of broad
educational policies. This reasoning becomes weaker when considered in
that the elements of proximate cause and injury could also be established. Id. at 443, 391
N.E.2d at 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 107,
at 741. However, in the court's reasoning, the fact that a complaint alleging educational mal-
practice could be formally pleaded under the traditional principles of tort law did not, in itself,
require a court to entertain such a claim. 47 N.Y.2d at 444, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 377.
67. Id. at 444, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
68. Id. at 444-45, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 444, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377. See N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 4;
Id. art. XI, § 2; N.Y. EDUC. §§ 207, 305 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1987).
70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 66.
73. Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
1988]
Wilkins: Educational Malpractice:  A Cause of Action in Need of a Call for
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
440 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
light of the vast amount of day-to-day policy-making activities that most
courts are willing to review such as those undertaken by doctors, lawyers,
and accountants. 74
Following Peter W. and Donohue, the next major case involving educa-
tional malpractice was Hoffman v. Board of Education of City of New
York.75 Although Hoffman was labeled as an educational malpractice ac-
tion, the case involved student claims of improper classification and place-
ment within the educational system, instead of general claims for failure to
educate.76 Despite the different nature of the claims presented in Hoffman,
the Hoffman court followed Peter W. and Donohue and refused to recog-
nize a cause of action in the plaintiff's complaint.
The plaintiff in Hoffman initiated an action against the Board of Edu-
cation of the City of New York. The complaint contained allegations of
negligence in the school board's original assessment of the plaintiff's intel-
lectual ability and failure to retest him pursuant to the original recommen-
dation by the school board psychologist. 7 7 The plaintiff claimed that the
school board's negligent acts and omissions caused him to be misclassified
and improperly enrolled in the program for children with retarded mental
development, resulting in severe injury to his intellectual and emotional de-
velopment and a substantially reduced ability to obtain employment.7 8 The
74. See supra notes 13-23.
75. 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
76. See Note, Nonliability for Negligence in the Public Schools for 'Educational Mal-
practice' From Peter W. to Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 814 (1980) [hereinafter Note,
Nonliabilityl (arguing that Hoffman was incorrectly labeled as an educational malpractice
action).
Hoffman represents a form of educational malpractice quite different from that found in
Peter W. and Donohue. Daniel Hoffman developed a severe speech impediment at an early
age. Upon entering kindergarten in the New York City school system, a certified clinical psy-
chologist employed by the defendant school board administered a primarily verbal intelligeince
test and determined that Hoffman had an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 74, only one point
below the maximum score statutorily required for student placement in classes for Children
with Retarded Mental Development (CRMD). Hoffman, 49 N.Y.2d at 123, 400 N.E.2d at
318, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 377. Based on the results of the IQ test, the clinical psychologist recom-
mended Hoffman's placement in a CRMD class and re-evaluation within two years. Id. at 124,
400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 377. Pursuant to the recommendation, Hoffman was
enrolled in the CRMD program in 1957; however, his intelligence was not re-evaluated until
1969. Id. at 124, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378. After Hoffman had been "closeted
with retarded children for more than twelve years," in a program specifically designed for
children with retarded mental development, he was finally administered an intelligence test for
adults and found to possess a full scale IQ of 94, thus placing him within the normal range of
intelligence. Id. at 124, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378. Thereafter, Hoffman, then
over eighteen years old, was informed that he was no longer qualified to attend the Queens
Occupational Training Center, a manual and shop training center designed specifically for
retarded youths. Id. at 124, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 125, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1988], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss2/6
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
plaintiff maintained the position that, but for the school's misclassification
and improper enrollment of the student, he would have been exposed to a
normal education, thereby receiving the important academic, social, and
cultural values necessary for functioning normally in society. 9
The lower courts agreed with Hoffman's position. The trial court
awarded Daniel Hoffman a judgment of $750,000.80 The intermediate ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling distinguishing Peter W. and
Donohue as cases involving educational torts for mere nonfeasance, whereas
Hoffman's claim involved misfeasance in failing to follow the individualized
and specific prescription of the defendant school board's own clinical psy-
chologist. 8 The intermediate court added:
Therefore, not only reason and justice, but the law as well, cry
out for an affirmance of plaintiff's right to a recovery. Any other
result would be a reproach to justice. In the words of the ancient
Romans: "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" (Let justice be done,
though the heavens fall).82
However, the intermediate court reduced the verdict to $500,000.83
In a four-to-three decision, the New York Court of Appeals reversed
and dismissed Hoffman's complaint because the claim sounded in "educa-
tional malpractice." Following Donohue, the Court of Appeals held that
such a cause of action should not, as a matter of public policy, be enter-
tained by the courts. 84 Rejecting the lower court's misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction, the Court of Appeals applied the same policy considerations
that prompted its decision in Donohue.8 5 Although the complaint in Hoff-
man did not allege a failure to educate, as in Peter W. and Donohue, the
court nevertheless classified and dismissed the allegations as involving "edu-
79. Id.
80. Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 64 A.D.2d 369, 387, 410
N.Y.S.2d 99, I11 (1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
81. If the door to "educational torts" for nonfeasance is to be opened .... it will not
be by this case which involves misfeasance in failing to follow the individualized and
specific prescription of defendant's own certified psychologist, whose very decision it was
in the first place, to place plaintiff in a class for retarded children, or in the initial making
by him of an ambiguous report, if that be the fact.
Hoffman, 64 A.D.2d at 386, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 110. See Diamond, Education Law, 29 SYRA-
cusE L. REv. 103, 150-51 (1978) (arguing that liability should be found in Hoffman because
the thrust of the plaintiff's case was not a failure to provide a positive program for a student,
but rather, affirmative acts of negligence by the school board). For a discussion of liability in
tort for nonfeasance as compared to misfeasance, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, §
56, at 373-75.
82. Hoffman, 64 A.D.2d at 387, 410 N.Y.S.2d at I1 I.
83. Id.
84. Hoffman, 49 N.Y.2d at 126, 400 N.E.2d at 320, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
85. Id.
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cational malpractice."
Following these three cases, educational malpractice actions can gener-
ally be classified into either one of two distinct categories: (1) those alleging
a failure to provide an adequate education, and (2) those alleging misclas-
sification and improper placement within the school system.86 By broaden-
ing the scope of educational malpractice actions, the courts have perhaps
stretched too far. In effect, any case containing the words "education" and
"negligence" with "physical injuries" is immediately labeled by the courts
as "educational malpractice" and quickly dismissed without regard to the
merits of the claim.
At least one court has refused to attach the fatal "educational mal-
practice" label to this type of claim. In B.M. v. State,87 a case involving a
fact situation similar to that in Hoffman, the Montana Supreme Court
reached a decision tending to follow the Hoffman dissent. 88 Although B.M.
was eventually dismissed on other grounds, 89 the court's analysis sheds a
ray of hope for future victims of negligence in the school systems.
In B.M., the plaintiff's foster mother alleged that the state was negli-
gent in placing B.M. in a segregated special education program, and that
the alleged misplacement violated the child's constitutional rights of due
86. Although Hoffman fell into the second category, several commentators have sug-
gested that claims similar to Hoffman should not be labeled as true "educational malpractice"
actions. See Funston, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of a Theory, 18
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743, 758 (1981) (arguably, it may be incorrect to conceptualize Hoffman
as an educational malpractice case); Note, Nonliability, supra note 76 (arguing that the New
York Court of Appeals erred in its classification of the facts in Hoffman as "educational mal-
practice" because Hoffman did not present a claim of educational malpractice in the tradi-
tional sense).
The one paragraph dissenting opinion in Hoffman stated:
IT]his case involves not 'educational malpractice' as the majority in this court suggests
but discernible affirmative negligence on the part of the board of education in failing to
carry out the recommendation for re-evaluation within a period of two years which was
an integral part of the procedure by which plaintiff was placed in a CRMD class, and
thus readily identifiable as the proximate cause of plaintiff's damages.
Hoffman, 49 N.Y.2d at 127, 400 N.E.2d at 321, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (Meyer, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
The scope of this note is limited to educational malpractice claims against public school
systems. Several similar cases have been successfully litigated against private schools, although
generally pleaded under theories of recovery sounding in contract law. See Pietro v. St. Jo-
seph's School, 48 U.S.L.W. 2229 (BNA N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1979) (educational mal-
practice action against a private school recognizing that tuition may be recovered if the school
breached an express contractual agreement with the parent that the student would attain a
certain proficiency level after completing a specified curriculum).
87. 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1982).
88. Id. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89. B.M. v. State, 698 P.2d 399 (Mont. 1985).
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process and equal protection.90 The Supreme Court of Montana remanded
the case for further proceedings.91 However, with regard to the existence of
a legal duty of care imposed upon the state to exercise reasonable care in
testing and placing the child in an appropriate educational program, the
court stated: "We have no difficulty in finding a duty of care owed to spe-
cial education students."93 The court deferred to the state constitution and
other state statutes specifically designed to govern the administration of
special education programs as evidence of a legal duty of care on the part
of the state.9"
90. B.M., 200 Mont. at 59, 649 P.2d at 425. Like Daniel Hoffman, while attending
kindergarten in a Montana school, B.M. displayed learning difficulties at an early age, appar-
ently the result of a speech impediment. Id. at 60, 649 P.2d at 426. Upon the recommendation
of the State Superintendent of Schools, the child was evaluated by a psychologist of the East-
ern Montana Regional Mental Health Center. The psychologist recommended that B.M. ei-
ther repeat her year in kindergarten or receive special educational help. Id. Pursuant to this
recommendation, the school officials sought state funds for the development of a special educa-
tion program for first graders, including B.M. In an effort to secure the necessary funds, an
application and plan outlining the special needs of the children were submitted to the Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction. The application contained a classification of B.M. as "educable
mentally retarded" (EMR), a status for which state policy required an individual learning
aptitude score of 50 to 75. However, B.M.s overall IQ score was determined to be 76. The
state superintendent subsequently approved the application and the program was implemented
whereby the four children in the program were to attend the regular first grade classroom. A
special education teacher was to provide the special help and support necessary for the chil-
dren "without segregating and labeling them." This process is sometimes referred to as "main-
streaming," which allows the instruction of children with special educational needs in the nor-
mal classroom. By not segregating the special students, they are exposed to the important
socialization functions which generally are accomplished only in the normal classroom. The
students are not separated or labeled, and therefore do not feel the usual "retarded" stigma so
often attached to the students when viewed as "outsiders."
After five weeks, the children in the special education program were found to be easily
distracted and thereafter moved to a separate classroom for their morning classes. B.M.'s fos-
ter parents were not informed of this change in the program format until after the child had
been attending the segregated class for nine weeks. Id. at 61, 649 P.2d at 426-27. Conse-
quently, the foster mother immediately removed B.M. from the special education program and
the school officials abruptly terminated the program. Id. at 61-62, 649 P.2d at 427. During the
nine week period in which B.M. attended the segregated classroom, the child's foster mother
witnessed a dramatic worsening in B.M.'s behavior, exemplified through the child's refusal to
dress herself and eat properly. Id. at 62, 649 P.2d at 427.
In the court's brief opinion, the sovereign immunity contention was quickly dismissed by
noting that the Montana Constitution (art. 1I, § 18) abolished such immunity absent express
contrary legislation. Id. at 62, 649 P.2d at 427.
91. Id. at 64, 649 P.2d at 428.
92. Id. at 63, 649 P.2d at 427.
93. Id. The constitutional provision relating to education for citizens in Montana states:
"It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which will develop the full
educational potential of each person. Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each
person of the state." MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1972).
The B.M. court rejected plaintiff's claims of unconstitutional violations of due process and
equal protection as without merit and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine
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Compared to Hoffman, B.M.'s fourteen-week wrongful placement in
the special education program was substantially less harmful in effect than
Hoffman's twelve-year ordeal; however, the Montana court was readily will-
ing to accept B.M.'s complaint without labeling it as "educational malprac-
tice." Although B.M. was eventually dismissed on other grounds, 94 the
court had "no difficulty in finding a duty of care" owed to the student.9
Therefore, the B.M. court apparently had no difficulty in finding a workable
standard of care to determine whether the state had breached this duty.
The Hoffman court, however, did not find a legal duty of care, simply be-
cause the complaint "smacked" of educational malpractice. The obvious
disparity between the Montana and New York courts' treatment of "mis-
classification" and "misplacement" cases demonstrates the need for clarifi-
cation in the educational malpractice arena.96
The current educational malpractice case law demonstrates the general
fear of the courts to become involved in virtually any non-tangible dimen-
sion of public education. This fear, however, has unfortunately left several
true victims in the dust of its fleeting path. With the exception of Montana,
the courts have generally applied an "educational malpractice" rubber
stamp to these otherwise plausible claims under the guise of public policy.
Perhaps, however, the very public policy that the courts so willingly rely
upon in rejecting these claims is the same public policy that "cr[ies] out for
an affirmance of plaintiff's right to recovery. '97
whether the state had indeed breached its legal duty of care in the negligence claim. B.M., 200
Mont. at 64, 649 P.2d at 427-28.
94. B.M. v. State, 698 P.2d 399 (Mont. 1985).
95. B.M., 200 Mont. at 63, 649 P.2d at 427.
96. Several cases involving allegations similar to those found in Hoffman and B.M. have
been initiated pursuant to the provisions in the federal Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act (EAHCA) of 1975. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982). The EAHCA establishes fed-
eral aid for state schools complying with its provisions in identifying handicapped children and
developing individualized special education programs that meet the unique needs of the handi-
capped child. The term "handicapped children" is defined as meaning "mentally retarded,
hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotion-
ally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with
specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special education and related ser-
vices." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). The Act provides a detailed format of
procedural safeguards whereby handicapped children and their parents or guardians can as-
sure the provision of a free appropriate education by the state educational agencies and units.
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982). The Act also establishes the right of an aggrieved parent or child to
bring a private civil action in federal court after exhaustion of all other available remedies
provided by the statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (1982). See Levinson, The Right to a Minimally
Adequate Education for Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL. U.L. REv. 253, 276-81 (1978).
97. Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 64 A.D.2d 369, 387, 410
N.Y.S.2d 99, 111 (1978). For discussion of the use of "public policy" grounds, see supra note
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IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF RECOVERY
To date, no plaintiffs bringing complaints which the courts have la-
beled as "educational malpractice" have prevailed in their actions." The
courts' uniform rejection of these complaints has prompted discussion from
several legal commentators and publicists regarding the plausibility of edu-
cational malpractice claims under different theories of recovery. 9 The most
popular theory of potential recovery appears to lie under the traditional tort
principles of professional negligence. 100 The other theories of recovery sug-
98. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
99. See Elson, A Common Law Remedy For the Educational Harms Caused by In-
competent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1978) (analyzing the general policy
considerations underlying the courts' reluctance to make decisions concerning educational poli-
cies); Funston, supra note 86 (arguing that the existent theories of recovery are logically un-
sound and inadequate to support an educational malpractice claim, and even if a legally suffi-
cient justification for recognizing such a cause of action could be found, compelling
considerations of public policy argue against such recognition); Jerry, Recovery in Tort for
Educational Malpractice. Problems of Theory and Policy, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 195 (1981)
(arguing that refusal to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice is incompatible
with accepted tort principles, and that a cogent theory supporting nonrecognition cannot be
articulated within the confines of the accepted principles and the general policies upon which
those principles are based); Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J.] (addressing the
alternative theories which form a basis of a suit for educational malpractice and suggesting
that an action for negligent misrepresentation may be the best theory for establishing liabil-
ity); Note, The ABC's of Duty, supra note 47 (analyzing various theories upon which to estab-
lish a legal duty of care on the part of the educators and comparing physical injuries on school
grounds to academic injuries received from educational malpractice); Note, Nonliability,
supra note 76 (arguing that Hoffman was incorrectly labeled as an educational malpractice
action, thus significantly expanding the scope of the term "educational malpractice"); Note,
Judicial Remedy, supra note 32 (investigating the feasibility of educational malpractice
grounded in negligence, focusing on legislative developments regarding the quality of educa-
tion and the potential impact of competency tests, and urging the judiciary to extend the pre-
sent liability that educators face for physical harm to encompass emotional and economic in-
jury as well); Note, Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to
Educate?, 14 TULSA LAW J. 383 (1978) (considering the viability of educational malpractice
actions in light of the educational accountability and competency-based education movements
in some states); Comment, Educational Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1976) [herein-
after Comment, U. PA. L. REV.] (addressing different theories of recovery and arguing that a
negligence suit stands the most chance of success with a comparative standard of care, that is,
the level of skill and learning of the minimally acceptable teacher in the same or similar com-
munities); Note, Educational Malpractice and a Right to Education: Should Compulsory
Education Laws Require a Quid Pro Quo?, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 555 (1982) [hereinafter Note,
Right to Education] (suggesting that students may bring an action for educational malpractice
by arguing that compulsory school attendance requires the state to provide a student and his
parents with a quid pro quo in order to avoid a constitutional violation of substantive due
process).
100. The popularity of the negligence theory of recovery is illustrated in the case law as
well as the public commentary. For a list of educational malpractice cases grounded in negli-
gence, see supra note 31. See also Jerry, supra note 99, Funston, supra note 99.
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gested have included notions of contract law, misrepresentation, and consti-
tutional grounds. 01
A. Contract
Under an action based on a contract theory of recovery, several ave-
nues of approach have been recognized. The first of these avenues involves
an implied contract between the student and the teacher, or between the
student and the school district. 102 Under this approach, the plaintiff alleges
that the educator promised to teach the student and provide a certain level
of education.10 8 Theoretically, the educator's promise could have been ei-
ther express, as found under the various state constitutions and statutes pro-
viding for public education, 10 4 or implied from the circumstances generally
surrounding the educational process - namely, an effort to provide an edu-
cation sufficient to prepare a student for a proper role in society. In ex-
change for this promise to provide a certain level of education, the student
may claim either his choice to forebear seeking education elsewhere, as in
101. See Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J., supra note 99 (misrepresentation); Note, The
ABC's of Duty, supra note 47 (contract); Note, Right to Education, supra note 99 (constitu-
tional grounds).
Some of these alternative theories have been advanced in the case law. In Peter W., two
alternative theories of recovery were advanced, negligence and misrepresentation. Peter W. v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854. B.M. included
claims for both negligence and constitutional violations of due process and equal protection.
B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425.
102. See Comment, U. PA. L. REv., supra note 99, at 784-89; Note, Right to Educa-
tion, supra note 99, at 563-64.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 comment a (1981):
Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The distinction involves, how-
ever, no difference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Just
as assent may be manifested by words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so
intention to make a promise may be manifested in language or by implication from other
circumstances, including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.
103. See Jerry, supra note 99, at 195.
104. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256 (amended 1956); ALASKA CONST. art VII, §
1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN.
CONST. art. 8, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; GA. CONST. art. 8, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1;
IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183;
LA. CONST. art. Viii, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. Vill, § I; MASS.
CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § II; MICH. CONST. art. VillI, § 2 (1963, amended. 1970); MINN. CONST.
art. XIII, § I; MISs. CONST. art. 8, § 201 (1890, amended 1960); Mo. CONST. art. IX, § I(a);
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.M. CONST.
art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § I; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § I; N.D. CONST. art. VIll, § 1;
OHIo CONST. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § I; S.C.
CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art.
VII, § I; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68 (1793, amended 1954, 1964); VA. CONST. art. VIii, § 1;
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § I; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § I; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3 (1848,
amended 1972); WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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private schools, or that his attendance in the public schools serves as the
necessary consideration.'0 " The student may then allege that the school dis-
trict failed to fulfill its promise, thereby breaching the implied contract by
not providing the agreed upon minimal level of education.
The major problem under a contractual theory of recovery is the estab-
lishment of the consideration or "bargained-for-exchange." ' 6 First, public
education is provided to all students free of cost. The students themselves
do not directly pay money in exchange for receiving public education. 07
Second, since school attendance is compulsory until a certain age, school
attendance cannot suffice as the necessary consideration. Yet, even if the
student could establish consideration through forbearance from seeking ed-
ucation elsewhere, this situation would have the anomalous effect of pre-
cluding students from lower-income households from raising the contract
claim, leaving the contractual theory of recovery available only to those
students from families wealthy enough to afford private education.'0 8
An alternative approach under a contract-based theory of recovery
would be to consider the student as a third-party beneficiary of an employ-
ment contract between the teacher and the school district, or of an implied
contract between the taxpayers and the school district. 09 In either case, the
student will have to demonstrate an "intent to benefit" a third party in
order to enforce the contract." 0 Clearly, the guiding purpose behind the
105. "Consideration" is defined as follows:
The inducement to a contract. The cause, motive, price, or impelling influence which
induces a contracting party to enter into a contract. The reason or material cause of a
contract. Some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbear-
ance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 277 (5th ed. 1979). See also Comment, U. PA. L. REv., supra
note 99, at 784-85.
106. "To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained
for" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). "In the typical bargain, the consid-
eration and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive or inducement: the consideration
induces the making of the promise and the promise induces the furnishing of consideration."
Id. § 71, comment b.
107. However, the taxpayers do pay money to support the school systems.
108. See Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J. supra note 101, at 185.
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981):
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the benefi-
ciary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to
pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary
the benefit of the promised performance.
Id.
110. See Comment, U. PA. L. REV., supra note 99, at 786. See also J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17-2 (1977). The "intent to benefit" exists if the benefi-
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employment of teachers and the appropriation of taxpayers' money con-
cerns the benefit to students in receiving a certain level of education.
Even if a student could establish his status as a third-party beneficiary,
practical problems of recovery remain. First, any liability for an individual
teacher or employee would be based upon a breach of contract, not upon a
tortious act. Therefore, the school district would not be vicariously liable."'
With liability resting on the teacher alone, the likelihood of receiving any
substantial monetary recovery is very remote." 2 Moreover, the question of
whether a promisor should be liable to third-party beneficiaries is generally
controlled by public policy considerations, which the courts have heavily
relied upon in rejecting educational malpractice claims.1 3 Finally, a further
obstacle under the contractual theory of recovery arises because the law of
contracts has traditionally been less flexible than the law of torts, and less
receptive to novel applications." 4 Therefore, potential recovery under the
contract theory appears highly unlikely.
B. Misrepresentation
The misrepresentation theory of recovery for educational malpractice
actions has previously been addressed by the courts. In Peter W.," 5 the
plaintiff alleged both intentional and negligent misrepresentation."' The
Peter W. court quickly dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claim on
the same public policy grounds that justified the dismissal of the plaintiff's
ciary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a
right on him. Id.
11. See Funston, supra note 86, at 762.
112. See supra note 11.
113. See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 588, 364 P.2d 685, 687, 15 Cal Rptr. 821,
823 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962):
[Tihe determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third
person not in privity is a matter of public policy and involves the balancing of various
factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suf-
fered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury, and the policy of preventing future harm.
114. See Funston, supra note 86, at 763; G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974).
115. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976).
116. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
"Defendant school district, its agents and employees, falsely and fraudulently represented
to plaintiff's mother and natural guardian that plaintiff was performing at or near grade
level in basic academic skills such as reading and writing .... " The representations
were false. The charged defendants knew that they were false, or had no basis for believ-
ing them to be true. "As a direct and proximate result of the intentional or negligent
misrepresentation made . . . , plaintiff suffered the damages set forth herein."
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negligence claim."' 7 Furthermore, the court dismissed the intentional mis-
representation contention because of the plaintiff's failure to include in the
pleadings any allegation of the requisite element of "reliance.' 'lls The
court's silence concerning the viability of a cause of action for intentional
misrepresentation if reliance had been properly pleaded could be construed
to imply that a properly pleaded complaint might have been successful.
An action for intentional misrepresentation, unlike negligent misrepre-
sentation, requires the specific intent that a representation be directed to a
particular person or class of persons, who subsequently acted in reliance
upon that representation."' A teacher's representation to the student and/
or parents, through report cards or teacher commentary, of passing grades
and satisfactory classroom performance, would suffice as the actual misrep-
resentation under such a cause of action. 20 However, the student would
also have to demonstrate that the teacher or school district possessed the
requisite intent to deceive. 2' An honest belief that the representation is
true, however unreasonable, on the part of the educator-defendant, will de-
feat an action for intentional misrepresentation.' 22 Proof of such intent to
deceive will be a difficult obstacle in an intentional misrepresentation
complaint.' 2s
117. Id. at 828, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. See supra note 62.
118. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 828, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 13, § 108, at 749.
119. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 828, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
120. Misrepresentation is defined as follows: "Any manifestation by words or other con-
duct by one person to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in
accordance with the facts. An untrue statement of fact." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 903 (5th
ed. 1979). In Peter W., the plaintiff not only received satisfactory report cards and passing
grades from his teachers, but also a high school diploma representing achievement of a 12th
grade level of education. However, Peter W. could only read and write at the fifth grade level.
Therefore, the report cards and diploma served as tangible evidence of the misrepresentation
made to the student.
121. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 107, at 741-45. The most important
intent in intentional misrepresentation actions is the intent to deceive, mislead, or convey a
false impression. Id. at 741.
122. Id. at 742.
123. However, proof of an intent to deceive on the part of the educator does not necessa-
rily pose an insurmountable burden. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1976)
provides:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be,
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he
states or implies, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states
or implies.
The Restatement then asserts the general rule:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the persons
or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from
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Even if an intent to deceive is present, students must demonstrate that
they justifiably relied on the educator's false representations."" As under
the contract-based theory of recovery, reliance would have to be shown by
proving that, had it not been for the misrepresentation, the student would
have been sent to a private school or provided private tutoring. 25 Moreover,
the justifiability of the reliance may be difficult to prove in light of the
parents' opportunity to view and assess their children's educational
development.2 6
Unlike intentional misrepresentation, an action for negligent misrepre-
sentation may proceed even if the representation was made with an honest
belief in its truth. Liability for negligent misrepresentation is based upon
the negligence of the actor in failing to exercise reasonable care or compe-
tence in supplying correct information for the guidance of others.1 7 A
claim could be brought under a negligent misrepresentation theory of recov-
ery through the use of report cards, intelligence quotient tests, diplomas, or
other statements or opinions of fact negligently made by the school or
teachers.
Several problems underlie the negligent misrepresentation theory of re-
covery. Like intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff must demonstrate
justifiable reliance on the negligent misrepresentation. 2 Furthermore,
action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss suffered by them
through their justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has
reason to expect their conduct to be influenced.
Id. at § 531. Conceivably, a teacher could report the satisfactory performance of a student
knowing the performance to be, in fact, unsatisfactory. Possibly, the teacher would be reluc-
tant to report failing grades for fear of the resulting reflection of the teacher's own perform-
ance and possible loss of employment. Perhaps, also, a teacher may represent that a student
has reached a certain level of proficiency in mathematics, knowing the representation to be
false, so as to keep the student on the school basketball team. Indeed, also conceivable is the
possibility that teachers could be coerced to make these misrepresentations by the school dis-
trict, in an effort to appear to have a "good record," favorable community reputation, or even
a successful football team. Although these are only possibilities, perhaps given similar real
factual circumstances, an educational malpractice action under an intentional misrepresenta-
tion theory of recovery may be successful.
124. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 108, at 749. "Not only must there be
reliance but the reliance must be justifiable under the circumstances." Id.
125. See Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J., supra note 99. See also text accompanying
note 101.
126. See Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J., supra note 99, at 133. For example, if the
parents witnessed their children's inability to read and write, the justifiability of the reliance
may be defeated.
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1976). See also Com-
ment, FORDHAM URB. L.J., supra note 99, at 133.
128. For discussion of justifiable reliance, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 108.
Again, this would have the anomalous effect of precluding lower-income class plaintiffs from
raising the negligent misrepresentation claim.
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where the negligent misrepresentation results in only pecuniary loss, not
physical harm, the courts have been more conservative in extending liability
because of the magnitude of losses which may result from careless misinfor-
mation.129 Moreover, even if these obstacles can be overcome, a court may
still dismiss such an educational malpractice complaint by relying on the
same policy considerations underlying rejection of educational malpractice
actions based on ordinary negligence theories.1 30
C. Constitutional Right
Although free public education is provided under state constitutions,' 3 1
the right to receive an education is not explicitly afforded protection under
the United States Constitution. In Brown v. Board of Education,12 the
United States Supreme Court recognized that "education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments."'' 3 1 In San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez,3 however, the Court recognized that educa-
tion is not a fundamental right afforded explicit or implicit protection under
the Constitution.'
Despite the absence of a federal constitutional right to an education,
an alternative constitutional approach has been proposed for educational
malpractice claims.'3 6 This approach involves a substantive due process ar-
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, comment a. PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 13, § 107, at 745. "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
130. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The Peter W. court dismissed the negli-
gent misrepresentation allegation for the same public policy considerations utilized in dis-
missing the negligence cause of action. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
131. See supra note 104.
132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. Id. at 493.
134. 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
135. Id.
Rodriguez involved a class action suit brought on behalf of students enrolled in the Texas
public schools as members of minority groups residing in school districts having a low property
tax base. The plaintiffs argued that the Texas system of financing public education, via
amounts collected through local property taxation, discriminated against students from poor
schools districts. As a result of this discrimination, the plaintiffs alleged, the state had a duty
to ensure the equal protection of their fundamental right to obtain an education.
The Court rejected the plaintiff's contentions by concluding that no fundamental right
was abridged where only relative differences in spending levels were involved and where "no
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process." id. Therefore, Rodriguez may be construed as meaning
that the quality of education need not be absolutely equal.
136. See Note, Right to Education, supra note 99.
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gument alleging that the state must provide a quid pro quo' 37 in return for
the deprivation of a constitutional liberty interest.' 38 Under this argument,
students attending schools under compulsory attendance laws are compared
to involuntarily confined mental institution patients. 39 In Donaldson v.
O'Connor,'4 the Fifth Circuit held that where an involuntarily confined
mental patient was confined under the theory of parens patriae,'41 due pro-
cess required that minimally adequate treatment be provided.4 2 The Don-
aldson court further held that if the confinement occurred under the state's
police power,' 3 due process required the state to provide a quid pro quo
137. "What for what; something for something. Used in law for the giving one valuable
thing for another. It is nothing more than the mutual consideration which passes between the
parties to a contract, and which renders it valid and binding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1123 (5th ed. 1979).
138. Note, Right to Education, supra note 99, at 568. See also Note, The Right to
Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796, 810 (1975) [hereinafter Note,
Constitutional Analysis].
The United States Supreme Court has recognized constitutionally protected liberty inter-
ests in students and parents. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399, the Court referred to a
fourteenth amendment liberty interest, stating:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaran-
teed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and bring up chil-
dren, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness among free men.
Id. (emphasis added).
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court recognized the "liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of children under their control." Id. at 534-35.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), the
Court recognized that students have independent constitutionally protected rights. Therefore,
because the Supreme Court has recognized these liberty interests, a student or parent may be
able to raise a substantive due process argument in an educational malpractice action. See also
Note, Right to Education, supra note 99, at 573.
139. See Note, Right to Education, supra note 99, at 568.
140. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
141. Parens patriae "refers traditionally to the role of state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). Under a
parens patriae rationale for confinement, the individual confined is in need of care or treat-
ment, and may be dangerous to himself, but he does not present a danger to others. See Note,
Right to Education, supra note 99, at 572.
142. Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 521.
143. "Police power" is defined as:
The power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property
rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promo-
tion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to
limitations of the federal and State constitutions, and especially to the requirement of due
process. Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote
order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an
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unless the conventional procedural safeguards of the criminal process were
applied. " '
The court's reasoning in Donaldson has been advanced as a theory of
recovery in educational malpractice claims.145 Under this theory, the stu-
dent argues that the school violated the student's substantive due process
rights to receive a minimally adequate education or a quid pro quo in re-
turn for his compulsory attendance at school."" However, this theory con-
tains several serious flaws, as demonstrated by a recent United States Su-
preme Court decision.
In Youngberg v. Romeo," 7 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered for the first time the substantive due process rights of involuntarily
committed mental patients, Youngberg involved claims that such patients
had constitutional rights to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from
bodily restraint, and minimally adequate habilitation." 8 The Court found
that safe conditions of confinement and freedom from bodily restraint were
judicially recognized liberty interests, but that the claim of a right to a
minimally adequate habilitation was "more troubling."' "9 The Court added:
[W]e agree that respondent is entitled to minimally adequate
training. In this case, the minimally adequate training required
by the Constitution is such training as may be reasonable in
light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from
bodily restraints. In determining what is "reasonable" - in this
and any case presenting a claim for training by the State - we
emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment ex-
ercised by a qualified professional.1 0
The court continued by expanding upon the importance of deference to the
judgment of a professional, noting that judges and juries are considerably
less capable of judging what is "minimally adequate training."151
essential attribute of government.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979). Under the police power rationale for confine-
ment, the patient is dangerous to himself as well as others. Note, Right to Education, supra
note 99, at 572.
144. Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 524.
145. Note, Right to Education, supra note 99; Note, Constitutional Analysis, supra
note 138; A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 128-31 (2d ed. 1980).
146. Note, Right to Education, supra note 99, at 568.
147. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
148. Id. at 2457. The case involved a profoundly retarded 33-year-old individual who
was involuntarily committed to a Pennsylvania state institution. The case was filed following
reports of injuries suffered by the patients, including Romeo's son.
149. Id. at 2458.
150. Id. at 2461.
151. Id. at 2462.
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In light of the Youngberg decision, any federal constitutional grounds
in an educational malpractice complaint are not likely to meet with success.
Indeed, in all of the educational malpractice cases on the books to date, no
student has successfully alleged that a school completely failed to provide
an education. In addition, unlike the mental patients, students are not invol-
untarily confined on a 24-hour-per-day basis, rather, only on a eight-hour-
per-day, 5-day-per-week basis. Moreover, since the Court accorded great
weight to the judgment of professionals in assessing the scope of "minimally
adequate training," the Court would also likely defer to the professional
judgment of teachers the question of what constitutes a minimally adequate
education. Thus, a constitutionally based theory of recovery may not pro-
vide the necessary recovery sought by victims of educational malpractice.
V. THE NEGLIGENCE THEORY OF RECOVERY
The most popular theory of recovery appears to lie under the tradi-
tional tort principles of professional negligence.1 52 The traditional formula
for pleading a cause of action containing allegations of negligence includes
four basic and essential elements. First, a duty recognized by law requiring
a party to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of
others against unreasonable risks must be established. Second, that duty
must be breached. Third, a reasonably close causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury must be present. Finally, actual loss or
damage resulting to the interests of another must be demonstrated.1 53
The first element of negligence, legal recognition of a duty on the part
of the defendant, first met with failure and was dismissed on public policy
grounds in Peter W.1 5 ' The Peter W. court found support from Raymond v.
Paradise Unified School District1 5  in refusing to recognize the existence of
a legal duty. The Raymond court articulated the proposition that judicial
recognition of a duty in the defendant is initially to be dictated by public
policy considerations. 6
An affirmative declaration of duty simply amounts to a state-
ment that two parties stand in such relationship that the law will
impose on one a responsibility for the exercise of care toward
the other. Inherent in this simple description are various and
152. See supra note 31.
153. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 30, at 164-65.
154. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976). See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
155. 218 Cal. App. 2d I, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963) (in action against school district for
injuries sustained by a seven-year-old student at school bus loading zone on high school prop-
erty, the school district had a duty to provide adequate supervisory measures to protect pri-
mary school children using the loading zone).
156. Id. at 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
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sometimes delicate policy judgments. The social utility of the
activity out of which the injury arises, compared with the risks
involved in its conduct; the kind of person with whom the actor
is dealing; the workability of a rule of care, especially in terms
of the parties' relative ability to adopt practical means of
preventing injury; the relative ability of the parties to bear the
financial burden of injury and the availability of means by
which the loss may be shifted or spread; the body of statutes and
judicial precedents which color the parties' relationship; the pro-
phylactic effect of a rule of liability; in the case of a public
agency defendant, the extent of its powers, the role imposed
upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by budget;
and finally, the moral imperatives which judges share with their
fellow citizens - such are the factors which play a role in the
determination of duty. 157
A close analysis of these factors relied upon by the Peter W. court in
refusing to recognize a legal duty of care in the school district reveals
favorable support for finding such a duty. The social utility of education is,
of course, of fundamental importance in society;'58 however, the risks in-
volved in the process of education are equally great. 5" If a child does not
receive a minimally adequate education, his chances of leading a fulfilled
and successful life are slim. A functionally illiterate individual cannot fill
out an application for employment, write checks or balance a checkbook to
pay bills, read street signs, complete election ballots, or understand warning
labels on dangerous medicine or machinery. The Peter W. court, however,
apparently did not consider these significant risks associated with an inade-
quate education.
The kind of person with whom the educators are dealing is generally a
vulnerable child. The child is greatly dependent on the individual skills of
the teacher, the information provided by the teacher, and the organization
of the school district. If the school district hires incompetent employees, the
child suffers directly from the incompetency. Although parents are also re-
sponsible for the child's education, the parents do not accompany the child
to the classroom on a daily basis. Moreover, if the child is involved in an
unfortunate family situation where perhaps the parents rarely, if ever, have
the opportunity to fully assess the child's educational development, the
school district maintains an even greater position of power and control over
the student.'60
157. Id. at 8-9, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
158. See supra note 3.
159. See supra notes 8, 11.
160. See supra note 51.
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Another factor in Raymond used in determining the existence of a le-
gal duty involves the workability of a standard of care. The Donohue court
specifically stated that the creation of a workable standard of care did not
necessarily pose an insurmountable burden. 61 A standard of care, although
perhaps at times difficult to apply, has been developed and used by the
courts in various other types of professional negligence actions. 62 The stan-
dard of care generally applied in these actions is that of reasonableness in
the particular field.1 63
The school district's relative ability to adopt practical means of
preventing injury is significantly greater than that ability of the student,
because the school district has at hand the resources to use in hiring compe-
tent teachers and promoting an efficient educational system. This fact also
relates to the relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of
the injury caused by educational malpractice. The true victims of educa-
tional malpractice will most often come from low-income households, una-
ble to pay the costs of private education or tutoring, and unable to bear the
financial burden of educational malpractice.
The body of statutes and judicial precedents which color the parties
relationship also favors recognition of a legal duty of care in the educator.
Although the current case law reflects a consistent rejection of the cause of
action labeled as "educational malpractice," most state constitutions specifi-
cally provide a free and mandatory public education for the citizenry.""
Furthermore, most states have several volumes of statutes on the shelves
specifically designed for the public education systems.
The prophylactic effect of -a rule imposing liability could have a great
impact on the quality of education. Teachers would be encouraged to be
more careful not only in instructing the students, but also in accurately
assessing student progress and reporting such progress to the parents. The
courts have voiced concern that recognition of a cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice would result in a flood of countless tort claims against
the schools. "' However, since the plaintiffs must demonstrate a sufficient
causal connection between the actual conduct of the school and the resul-
tant injury, such a "floodgate" would not be opened.
Finally, the factor which looks to the moral imperatives that judges
share with their fellow citizens clearly demands an opportunity for victims
161. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979).
162. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
163. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 187.
164. See supra note 104.
165. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 861 (1976).
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of negligent teaching to seek legal redress.' 8 Prosser has noted that "as our
ideas of human relations change the law as to duties changes with them." '6 7
Therefore, the law should change to recognize a legal duty of care for
educators.
The second element necessary for pleading a cause of action for negli-
gence is met when the student establishes a breach of a legal duty.16 8 The
breach is established by showing that the educator did not meet that stan-
dard of care required by the duty. Usually, in negligence actions, the stan-
dard of care is that which would be applied by a reasonable person. 6" In
professional malpractice actions, the standard used is generally that level of
care which is reasonable in light of the superior learning and experience, in
addition to any special skills, knowledge, or training normally possessed by
a person in that particular field.1 70
In educational malpractice cases, the courts have refused to recognize
a legal duty because of the general fear of developing and assessing a stan-
dard of care. By applying a professional standard of care to educational
malpractice actions, the courts would indeed become somewhat involved in
assessing the day-to-day implementation of broad educational policy deci-
sions. However, the courts become similarly involved when hearing medical,
accountant, or lawyer malpractice cases. Like other professional negligence
cases, the courts will be able to avail themselves of highly qualified expert
witnesses. Moreover, since the focus of the standard of care is placed upon
reasonableness, the courts certainly are able to reach a fair determination.
The third element which must be established in a negligence action is
the causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury. In cases
like Hoffman' 7 ' and B.M.,172 a causal connection is easily established. A
specific actor either negligently classified the child or failed to follow a spe-
cific recommendation at a specific date and time. However, in cases like
Peter W.' 7 3 and Donohue,7 4 establishing a causal connection presents a
more difficult problem. Clearly the act of one particular teacher in the
school system cannot cause a student to graduate from high school as a
functional illiterate. Rather, the causal connection must be established as a
166. See supra notes 31, 82.
167. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 53, at 359.
168. Id. § 30, at 164-65.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 30, at 185.
171. Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d
317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
172. B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1982).
173. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976).
174. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352,
418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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chain of events, acts, misrepresentations, and omissions over a period of
time. Although such a chain of causation may be difficult to prove, it is
possible. The lack of sufficient contact between various teachers and the
parents, test scores, homework grades, teacher qualification requirements,
past teacher performance, and ultimately the high school diploma will aid
the plaintiff in establishing the causal connection.
The final element necessary for a negligence action includes the actual
loss or damage resulting to the plaintiff. This element can be easily estab-
lished by the true victims of educational malpractice. Harm resulting from
a reduced ability to seek gainful employment certainly is not a novel con-
cept for the courts. Although in most cases the student receives some degree
of affirmative education, the student still suffers considerable injury by not
seeking an adequate education elsewhere in time to enter the job market.
The chances of success under a negligence theory of recovery clearly
appear to be favorable for the true victims of educational malpractice. Un-
fortunately, these chances of success themselves fall victim to the semantic
game played by the courts. By simply attaching the label "educational mal-
practice," the courts quickly and unnecessarily deny the plaintiffs an oppor-
tunity to recover.
VI. THE CALL FOR ACTION: A PROPOSAL
Because of the almost uniform rejection of educational malpractice
claims by the courts, the most plausible solution appears to lie in the indi-
vidual state legislatures. Although many state officials fear the creation of
new forms of state liability, the role of the legislature is to represent the
will of the people. Moreover, many states have abolished sovereign immu-
nity for certain tortious conduct. This abolition represents the will of the
people to hold the sovereign responsible for negligent acts or omissions.
Therefore, legislative recognition of a cause of action for educational mal-
practice is a viable remedy for victims of negligent instruction.
A model statute providing such legislative recognition may read as
follows:
Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, every school
district shall be liable for, and shall assume the liability, for
damages sustained by any student within the school district by
reason of the professional negligence of any teacher, counselor,
or official employed by the school district. For purposes of this
section, "professional negligence" means any negligent act or
omission to act by an education provider in the rendering of pro-
fessional services, as determined in light of the educators' pro-
fession and the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily employed
by members of the profession in good standing in this state,
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which act is the proximate cause of substantial injury.17
This model statue will provide a workable standard of care for the
courts to use in assessing educational malpractice complaints. By employing
that standard of care applicable in professional negligence actions, the stan-
dard encompasses that which is reasonable for the members of the profes-
sion in good standing, in light of their special education, training, knowl-
edge, skill, and experience.1 76  Additionally, in utilizing a professional
negligence standard, the statute focuses more on the failure to invoke mini-
mally acceptable methods of education rather than the failure to provide a
minimally adequate education. By comparing the educator's claimed tor-
tious conduct to the methods of education accepted and used by members
of the education profession in good standing, the courts may avoid the
broad inquiry required to assess the adequacy of a child's education in
general.
The statute intends to provide a standard of care that is both appropri-
ate and workable. In setting forth a basis of liability, the courts will no
longer be able to refuse to find a legal duty of care in the educators. The
professional negligence standard of care is appropriate to determine
whether this duty has been breached.
Moreover, the statute is workable because it remains flexible. Instead
of specifically stating the scope of the standard of care, the statute provides
a general framework for the courts to apply as different situations arise.
Therefore, the statue may withstand the test of time as the profession
changes with the times. In addition, despite the courts' reluctance to be-
175. This statute utilizes the commonly accepted definition of professional negligence.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 187.
The adoption of the proposed statute will not necessarily result in a "flood of litigation"
and consequences beyond calculation in terms of public time and money. See Peter W., 60 Cal.
App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (addressing the fear that to hold educators to an action-
able duty of care would expose schools to countless tort claims). Several defenses remain avail-
able to a school district that will eliminate many bogus or weak educational malpractice
claims. Contributory or comparative negligence, as well as supervening cause appear to be the
primary defenses likely to rebut such claims. Because so many variable factors influence the
process of education, see Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861, such as a
child's failure to complete homework or refusal to learn, the factors will serve as defenses to a
school district. These factors will also serve to discourage many potential plaintiffs contemplat-
ing an educational malpractice action. Thus the proposed statute will likely continue to pre-
clude relief to plaintiffs with claims similar to those in Peter W. and in Donohue. For a discus-
sion of the proximate cause requirement, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, §§ 41-45, at
263-321. On the other hand, the proposed statute may provide relief to plaintiffs with claims
similar to those in Hoffman and B.M. where, although the same defenses are available, the
causation requirement is more easily established. Therefore, the feared flood of litigation upon
adoption of this statute will most likely not materialize.
176. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 185.
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come involved in the daily implementation of educational policies, the
courts should feel comfortable with the principles underlying professional
negligence. 17 7
VII. CONCL.USION
Educational malpractice has not yet been recognized as a legally reme-
diable cause of action. The courts have refused to recognize educational
malpractice because of the general fear of developing and assessing a work-
able standard of care by which to measure the educator's conduct. How-
ever, a profession that plays such a vital role in contemporary society
should not be allowed to operate outside the realm of the justice system
simply because the profession involves delicate, day-to-day policy
implementation.
The uniform rejection of educational malpractice by the courts, and
the unfortunate victims of negligence in the schools, illustrate the immedi-
ate need for a call to action in this area. However, the courts are unwilling
to alter their paths, despite repeated attempts to persuasion. Therefore, leg-
islative recognition of educational malpractice will prove to be the most effi-
cient means for redressing the injuries suffered from educational malprac-
tice. The standard of care generally applicable to professional negligence
actions can be successfully used in the education profession as well. More
importantly, however, recognition of this cause of action may be one ap-
proach to eliminating the illiteracy crisis currently facing the nation. Edu-
cation, as a fundamental aspect of the foundation of contemporary Ameri-
can society, deserves consideration in the family, in the legislatures, and in
the courts.
KIMBERLY A. WILKINS
177. For a discussion of the scope of professional negligence cases, see supra notes 14-23
and accompanying text.
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